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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
“The makers of our Constitution understood the need to secure conditions favourable to the 
pursuit of happiness, and the protections guaranteed by this are much broader in scope, and 
include the right to life and an inviolate personality – the right to be left alone – the most 
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. The principle underlying 
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments is protection against invasions of the sanctities of a man’s 
home and privacies of life. This is a recognition of the significance of man’s spiritual nature, 
his feelings, and his intellect.”1  
 
 
 When, in 1928, Justice Brandeis expressed his opinion in Olmstead v. United 
States,2 mentioning the “right to be left alone”, it was unlikely that he could have 
foreseen the impact of these words. This ruling was to shape the decisions of U.S. courts 
for decades to come when they were called upon to adjudicate on matters pertaining to 
the “right to privacy”. 
The right to privacy is not explicitly mentioned anywhere in the Constitution of 
the United States. However, the Bill of Rights specifically addresses aspects of privacy, 
such as the privacy of beliefs and of free speech (First Amendment), privacy of the 
individual and protection of their property from unreasonable searches (Fourth 
Amendment), or the Fifth Amendment’s protection of personal information. In addition, 
the Ninth Amendment states that the enumeration of certain rights in the Bill of Rights 
shall not be construed to deny or disparage other rights retained by people. The Ninth 
Amendment, in particular, and more recently the idea of “liberty” protected by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were used to define and generally protect 
the privacy of family, marriage, motherhood, procreation, the right to choose one’s 
partner, to die and so forth.3  
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The question of whether the Constitution protects privacy in ways not expressly 
provided in the Bill of Rights is indeed controversial and in many cases basically divided 
those interested into two camps. The dilemma about the fundamental existence of our 
right to privacy and its extent has caused heated debates among scholars, justices, 
politicians and even laymen. It is impossible to distinguish where the boundaries of the 
right to privacy are – the courts’ preference for a case-by-case approach and changing 
public opinion on its status make the matter even more complicated.  
 
The aim of my research is to analyse the changing nature of privacy law and its 
evolution in U.S. jurisprudence from 1965, a year significant for the Griswold trial4, 
which heralded the beginning of modern era of privacy controversy, up to the present 
when in 2007 the Supreme Court expressed their decision on partial-birth abortion issue 
in Gonzales v. Carhart.5 The privacy issues faced by the courts in this period made for 
highly complex challenges. Assuming that there exists a general right of privacy, one has 
to establish what sort of conduct lies at its very centre and periphery and consider what 
sort of conduct should be outside of the protection of a right of privacy – a task, which is 
not easy at all and requires considerable evaluation of internal and external factors as well 
as possible consequences. Questions whether the right to privacy can and should protect 
individuals’ actions, such as euthanasia, domestic violence, polygamy, drug usage and 
many more, are at the centre of heated debates within professional and laymen circles.  
Right to privacy is a very broad term and consequently, there are a vast number of 
issues connected to it. Cases, which were decided on the grounds of privacy range from 
consent searches during traffic stops, through infrared imagining of homes (or other high-
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tech scanning), drug usage or property trespassing, to more serious problems such as 
birth control rights, the right to marry, homosexual rights, the right to choose to die and 
many more. Analysing privacy rights on a case-by-case basis is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. For the purposes of this research, I will concentrate only on one aspect of right to 
privacy issues – birth control - which covers the right to use contraception and right to 
chose whether to continue pregnancy or not. Supreme Court decisions regarding birth 
control create very significant part of privacy rights; and in spite of the fact issues like 
right to die or homosexual rights are equally important, I believe that with regards to the 
limits of this paper, the changing nature of privacy rights can be best reflected 
specifically via analysis of birth control issues. Through the analysis of specific Supreme 
Court cases, I will try to demonstrate how the nature of privacy rights has changed and 
developed and what the current criticisms of these decisions are more than forty years 
after the modern era of privacy rights controversy began. 
 
In relationship to the methodology employed, I analysed and evaluated a vast 
number of primary and secondary sources. First, as decisions of all Supreme Court cases, 
which I analyse in later sections of this paper, were decided on the grounds of 
constitutionality, The Constitution of the United States and its Amendments stand at the 
centre of my research – especially the First Amendment (which reflects privacy of beliefs 
and free speech), Fourth Amendment (unreasonable searches), Ninth Amendment (the 
enumeration of certain rights in the Bill of Rights shall not be construed to deny or 
disparage other rights retained by people) and liberty protected by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, form the basis of the cases examined and thus the 
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whole privacy issue regarding birth control rights.  
The second group of primary sources I used in order to evaluate the changing 
nature of privacy rights were the very Supreme Court cases, starting with Griswold v. 
Connecticut in 1965, that gave birth to the modern notion of privacy rights; through 
Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972),6 which extended the right to privacy in terms of birth control 
to unmarried couples; the landmark cases of Roe v. Wade7 and Doe v. Bolton,8 both 
argued in 1973, which justified the idea of privacy with regards to termination of 
pregnancy; or Carey v. Population Services International (1977),9 which extended the 
right to use contraceptives to minors. I then turn to a new era in which perspectives upon 
privacy became more conservative and restrictive, and even threatened to overturn the 
landmark Roe decision such as Webster v. Reproductive Services (1989);10 or Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey (1992)11 upholding restrictions on abortion; up to very recent 
Gonzales v. Carhart (2007) upholding the “Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act” of 200312.  
Last, but not least, secondary literature provided valuable insights into the right to 
privacy controversy and a critical approach to the decisions made in the above cases. A 
very good introduction to the problem can be found in Amitai Etzioni, The Limits of 
Privacy (New York, 1999) and Philippa Strum, Privacy: The Debate in the United States 
since 1945 (New York, 1998). John H. F. Shattuck, Right of Privacy (Illinois, 1979); 
David J. Bodenhamer and James W. Ely, ed., The Bill of Rights in Modern America After 
200 Years (Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1993); and Hull, Hoffer and Hoffer, The 
Abortions Rights: Controversy in America (Chapel Hill and London, 2004) – they all 
study specific court cases and legal documents, which relate to privacy rights and 
personal liberties and provide valuable sources of primary documents.  Birth control 
 7
rights literature is endless and one can find a vast number of articles, books or internet 
resources covering many aspects – whether we consider its history, controversy or 
criticism of specific laws or court decisions: Donald H. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade 
(1979) and Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy (1989) both provide a critical approach 
regarding the Roe decision. More recent publications that offer valuable analysis of the 
core debates, clarify the jurisprudence behind the Court’s ruling, and gauge its impact on 
American society include Clare Cushman, ed., Supreme Court Decisions and Women’s 
Rights (Washington, 2001); Hull and Hoffer, Roe v. Wade: The Abortion Rights 
Controversy in American History (Kansas, 2001) or the very exhaustive volume by David 
J. Garrow, Liberty and Sexuality: The Right to Privacy and the Making of Roe v. Wade 
(California, 1998) – just to name a few. Although these publications are indubitably 
highly valuable and provide important insight into the problem, during my research I 
struggled to find a publication that would specifically deal with the historical 
development of the right to privacy and an analysis of its changing nature in the U.S. 
jurisdiction.13 My aim is to fill this gap although just on a very small scale. 
 
Although neither the Constitution, nor the Bill of Rights explicitly mention 
“privacy”, some justices held the view that the right was to be found in the penumbras of 
other constitutional protections or was protected by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth  Amendment.14 The other justices held concurring opinion in which they used 
the Ninth  Amendment to defend the Supreme Court’s ruling, or state that the right to 
privacy is to be found nowhere in the Constitution.15 Although the modern issue of right 
to privacy officially dates from the 1965 case Griswold v. Connecticut, justices were 
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dealing with privacy issues nearly two centuries ago. 
According to Rubenfeld, the first case, which can be considered as a “privacy” 
case, was decided in 1803 and called Marbury v. Madison.16 Rubenfeld argues that 
Marbury is “a progenitor of the right-to-privacy decisions because it too belongs to the 
diverse series of cases in which the Supreme Court has reached out beyond the express 
language of the Constitution and struck down on constitutional grounds some piece of 
federal or state legislation.”17 Calder v. Bull (1798)18 and Trustees of Dartmouth College 
v. Woodward (1819)19 also belong to this family, as they were decided on the grounds of 
the Ninth Amendment, which provides: “The enumeration in the Constitution, or certain 
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people”.  
After the Civil War, the first passage of the Fourteenth Amendment gave the 
Court even more constitutional material to consider – especially its Due Process Clause.20 
In two decisions in 1920’s, the Supreme Court read the Fourteenth Amendment’s liberty 
clause to prohibit states from interfering with the private decisions of teachers and 
parents to shape the education of children – namely in Meyer v. Nebraska (1923)21 and 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925).22 As Rubenfeld states, these two cases may be seen as 
the “true parents of the privacy doctrine, and today they are frequently classified together 
with other privacy decision.”23  
The privacy doctrine of the 1920’s was renewed during 1960’s, when the Warren 
Court in Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) struck down a state law prohibiting the 
possession, sale, and distribution of contraceptives to married couples. The Court stated 
that “right to privacy” could be discerned in the “penumbras” of the first, third, fourth, 
fifth and ninth amendments.24  
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Two years later, in Loving v. Virginia25 the Court struck down a law criminalizing 
interracial marriage. The Court ruled that states could not interfere in that manner with an 
individual’s choice of whom to marry and on similar grounds; the Court also invalidated 
laws restricting the ability of poor persons to marry or divorce. Although the Court relied 
in part on the holding that the statute violated the equal protection clause, the opinion 
rested on a privacy rationale as well.26 In 1969, the Court concluded that the right of 
privacy protected an individual’s right to possess and view pornography in his own home. 
Justice Marshall wrote in Stanley v. Georgia:27  
 
“Whatever may be the justifications for other statutes regulating obscenity, we do not think 
they reach into the privacy of one’s own home. If the First Amendment means anything, it 
means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books 
he may read or what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the 
thought of giving government the power to control men’s minds.”27  
 
 
 In 1972, in Eisenstadt v. Baird the Court extended its Griswold decision to protect 
the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons. The next year, the Court took a 
further step and delivered its most controversial opinion probably since Brown v. Board 
of Education.29 Justice Blackmun, with only two Justices dissenting, wrote in Roe v. 
Wade that the right to privacy was broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision 
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.  
 After Roe’s decision, the Court, however, resisted several invitations to expand 
the right even further. Kelley v. Johnson (1976)30, in which the Court upheld a grooming 
regulation for police officers, illustrates the trend toward limiting the scope of the “zone 
of privacy”. The Court’s important landmark decision, in which a 5-4 majority held that a 
state could make homosexual sodomy a criminal offence without violating the right to 
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privacy, was decided in 1986 in Bowers v. Hardwick.31 Although this decision was 
overturned in 2003 in Lawrence v. Texas,32 the Court in Hardwick necessarily drew a 
line: the right to privacy stops here. In spite of the fact the Lawrence decision overruled 
seventeen years old Bowers decision; this case substantially differed from the 1986 one: 
the Court in Lawrence found that the state lacked a legitimate interest in regulating the 
private sexual conduct of consenting adults. The vital vote of Justice O’Connor, however, 
rested not on the privacy grounds, but solely on the Equal Protection Clause. 
 In relationship to post-Roe cases regarding birth control rights, the Court upheld 
its conservative stance refusing to expand privacy rights in broader terms. Cases such as 
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, Hodgson v. Minnesota (1989),33 Ohio v. Akron 
Center for Reproductive Health (1990),34 Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992), or very 
recent Stenberg v. Carhart (2000)35 and Gonzales v. Carhart (2007) – they all deal with 
issue of expanding privacy rights. These cases will be discussed in more detail in the 
following chapters. One feature, however, which all these cases have in common is that 
the Court refused fully bestow the privacy right to those concerned and also, shifted its 
decisions from dangerous (and for many controversial) privacy grounds to the “safer” 
equal protection and personal autonomy.  
 I want to conclude this brief outline of the historical development of privacy 
rights with one of the most sensitive problems – that is regarding the right to terminate 
life. The Court first addressed this issue in the 1990 case Cruzan v. Director, Missouri 
Department of Health36. In Cruzan, the Court considered whether Missouri could insist 
on proof of evidence of a comatose patient’s desire to terminate her life before allowing 
her family’s wish to disconnect her feeding tube to be carried out. Although eight of nine 
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justices disagreed that the right to die was a liberty protected by the Due Process Clause, 
a bare majority of the Court upheld the state’s insistence that the patient would wish to 
have intravenous feeding discontinued. Seven years later the Court again faced right to 
die issues, in two cases involving challenges to laws criminalizing physician-assisted 
suicide – Washington v. Glucksberg37 and Vacco v. Quill.38 Although the lower courts in 
each case found the law unconstitutional (decisions rested on due process right-to-privacy 
grounds and equal protection grounds), the Supreme Court reversed the decisions in both 
cases, finding the laws to be constitutional. Although the Court interpreted Cruzan as 
recognising a right to refuse medical treatment, the Court found no constitutional basis 
for a right to assisted suicide.39 
 
In the next sections I will analyse specific Supreme Court decisions and argue that 
the structure of privacy rights has changed during these trials. In Section I. I will 
elaborate on the beginning of the modern era of privacy, specifically concentrating on 
two cases Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) and Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972). Section II. will 
be dedicated to an analysis of Roe v. Wade (1973) and the less well-known, but 
concurrent and equally significant case of Doe v. Bolton (1973). Section III. will 
concentrate on post-Roe cases such as Carey v. Population Services International (1977), 
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services (1989), Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992), 
Stenberg v. Carhart (2000) and the very recent Gonzales v. Carhart (2007).  
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I.  THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE BATTLE FOR BIRTH 
CONTROL: GRISWOLD V. CONNECTICUT (1965) AND 
EISENSTADT V. BAIRD (1972) 
 
As we learned in the introductory part of this research, issues regarding the right 
to privacy date back to the creation of the U.S. Constitution. In this section, I will 
concentrate on the beginnings of the modern era or privacy rights controversy and I will 
analyse a crucial starting point trial – Griswold v. Connecticut and the consecutive cases 
Eisenstadt v. Baird and Carey v. Population Services. 
Abortion and birth control techniques were not treated as crimes during the 
United States’ early history. Recipes of herbal abortifacients were commonly found in 
cookbooks and throughout the 1700s and 1800s midwives routinely provided women 
with abortion-inducing substances when they wanted to terminate pregnancy. Some states 
prohibited abortions after “quickening” – that is, after a woman first felt fetal movement, 
usually during the fourth month of pregnancy. Even then the act was considered no more 
than a minor offence rather than a crime.1  
The driving force behind the original anti-birth control statutes was a New Yorker 
called Anthony Comstock. Born in a rural Connecticut, he moved to New York and was 
appalled by what he saw in the city’s streets: It seemed to him that the town was teeming 
with the prostitutes and pornography. By the late 1860s, he had already become a police 
informant, letting law enforcement know about sex workers and came to prominence 
with his anti-obscenity crusade. As a head of the New York Society for the Suppression 
of Vice, Comstock claimed to have “convicted persons enough to fill a passenger train of 
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sixty-one coaches, sixty containing sixty passengers each, and the sixty first almost full 
and also to have destroyed one hundred sixty tons of obscene literature”.2 In 1873 he 
successfully lobbied the U.S. Congress to pass an “Act for the Suppression of Trade In 
and Circulation of Obscene Literature and Articles of Immoral Use”.3  
      In reality, the “Comstock Law”, as it was called later in time, was targeted not 
only at obscenity but at birth control devices and information on such devices, at 
abortion, and at information on sexuality and on sexually transmitted diseases. This law 
was widely used to prosecute those who distributed information or devices for birth 
control. When asked why he classified contraceptives as obscene, Comstock replied: “If 
you open the door to anything, the filth will pour in.”4 Soon after the federal law hit the 
books, twenty four states passed their own versions. 
Planned Parenthood founder Margaret Higgins Sanger was a pioneer in 
establishing and protecting reproductive rights in the United States and fighting against 
the Comstock Laws. Working as a nurse in the ghettos of New York, she became familiar 
with the disturbing sights of many women dying of preventable deaths due to child 
labour, and the horrible methods of self-induced abortion. In 1912 she started writing a 
column for the New York Call entitled “What Every Girl Should Know” and by 
distributing a pamphlet, “Family Limitation”, to poor women, Sanger repeatedly risked 
scandal and imprisonment by acting in defiance of the Comstock Law of 1873. Two 
years later she launched “The Woman Rebel”, a monthly newsletter advocating 
contraception, and in 1916 Sanger opened a family planning and birth control clinic, 
which was the first of its kind in the United States.5 
          Sanger had travelled to Japan on many occasions and was in close touch with 
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Japanese feminist Kato Shidzue promoting birth control.6 In 1936 Sanger had a box of 
diaphragms mailed from Japan to a physician in New York City, Dr. Hannah Meyer 
Stone, who shared Sanger’s passion for reproductive rights. The shipment was seized and 
confiscated under the Tariff Act of 19307 and discussed at the court. The court held that 
the law could not be used to intercept shipments which originated from a doctor. The case 
United State v. One Package of Japanese Pessaries8 significantly weakened the 
Comstock Law and marked a turning point in birth control history. 
      
      After the Comstock Law was accepted by Federal government, twenty four states 
introduced their own version of that law, with Connecticut having probably the strictest 
one. Connecticut law prohibited the use of any drug, medicinal article or instrument for 
the purpose of preventing conception and penalized any person who advised about or 
provided contraceptive materials. Although the law was passed in 1879, the statute was 
almost never enforced. Despite the fact the attempts were made to test the constituality of 
the law, those challenges have failed on technical grounds.9  From 1941 to 1963 the 
Connecticut Birth Control League (now called the Planned Parenthood League of 
Connecticut), proposed a new reform bill during each legislative session. In 1961 they 
thought they had a winner – a case brought by clinic director and professor at the Yale 
School of Medicine, Dr. C. Lee Buxton, and several of his patients he deemed in medical 
need of contraception. Yet, in Poe v. Ullman,10 the Court refused to reach the 
constitutional question because the cases were brought in such a way as to “raise serious 
questions of nonjustuciability of [the] appelants’ claims.”11  
      In 1965 Estelle Griswold, executive director of the Planned Parenthood together 
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with Dr. Buxton, tried to test the contraception law once again. The Planned Parenthood 
opened a clinic in New Haven and after outraged private citizens agitated for legal action, 
both Griswold and Buxton were arrested, tried, found guilty and fined. Griswold then 
appealed her conviction to the Supreme Court of the United States. In Griswold v. 
Connecticut, the Court finally struck down, by a vote of 7 – 2, the Connecticut law. They 
invalidated the statute on the ground that it infringed on the constitutionally protected 
right to privacy of married persons.12  
      What Justice William O. Douglas, writing for majority, did in Griswold v. 
Connecticut, was to unite what he called the “penumbras” inherent in specific guarantees 
in the Bill of Rights – the First Amendment’s right of association, the Third 
Amendment’s prohibition against the intrusive quartering of soldiers in civilians’ homes 
during peacetime, the Fourth Amendment’s search and seizure clause, the Fifth 
Amendment’s self-incrimination clause and Ninth Amendment’s guarantee to the people 
of rights not specifically mentioned in the Constitution.13  “We deal”, he says, 
 
 
“…With a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights – older than our political parties, older 
than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully 
enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way 
of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial 
or social projects.”14  
 
 
 This opinion was also joined by Justices Arthur Goldberg and William Brennan and 
Chief Justice Earl Warren relying on the rarely cited Ninth Amendment. The right to 
privacy, Golderg maintained, predated the Constitution, and the Framers intended all 
liberties existing at the time should enjoy constitutional protection.15 Further, he argued: 
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“… In reaching the conclusion that the right of marital privacy is protected, as being within 
the protected penumbra of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights, the Court refers to the 
Ninth Amendment… It was proffered to quiet express fears that a bill of specifically 
enumerated rights could not the sufficiently broad to cover all essential rights and that the 
specific mention of certain rights would be interpreted as a denial that others were 
protected… To hold that a right so basic and fundamental and so deep-rooted in our society as 
the right of privacy in marriage may be infringed because that right is not guaranteed in so 
many words by the first eight amendments to the Constitution is to ignore the Ninth 
Amendment and to give it no effect whatsoever… [T]he Ninth Amendment shows a belief of 
the Constitution’s authors that fundamental rights exist that are not expressly enumerated in 
the first eight amendments and an intent that the list of rights included there not be deemed 
exhaustive…”16   
   
 
 
Justice John Marshall Harlan also concurred, but on a theory that the notion of liberty 
interests embedded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, which prohibits 
the states from denying any citizen “life, liberty or property without due process of law”, 
made sense and solved the entire problem of whether a right had been literally mentioned 
in the Constitution.17  
This view contrasted sharply with the position expressed by the two dissenters, 
Justices Hugo Black and Potter Stewart, who argued that the Bill of Rights and the 
Fourteenth Amendment did not allow judicial annulment of state legislative policies, 
even if those policies were abhorrent to a judge or justice.18 “’Privacy’”, says Justice 
Black,  
 
“…Is a broad, abstract and ambiguous concept, which can easily be shrunken in meaning but 
which can also, on the other hand, easily be interpreted as a constitutional ban against many 
things other than searches and seizures. I like my privacy as well as the next one, but I am 
nevertheless compelled to admit that government has a right to invade it unless prohibited by 
some specific constitutional provision. For these reasons I cannot agree with the Court’s 
judgment and the reasons it gives for holding this Connecticut law unconstitutional”.19    
    
      
 Further, he argues: “I can not rely on the Due Process Clause or the Ninth Amendment 
or any mysterious and uncertain natural law concept as a reason for striking down this 
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state law…”20      
Griswold established the principle that the Bill of Rights as a whole created a 
right to make certain intimate, personal choices, including the right of married people to 
engage in sexual intercourse for reproduction or pleasure.21 This case represents a 
landmark in history of battle for right for birth control in the United States and it started 
the era of controversial debates, which are vivid even these days.  
 
  Seven years after Griswold, the Supreme Court redefined the right to use and 
counsel the use of contraception as a right of sexual privacy not limited to married 
persons. In Massachusetts, William Baird was charged with the felony for distributing 
contraceptive foams during lectures on population control at Boston University. 
According to Massachusetts law, contraceptives could have been distributed only by 
registered doctors or pharmacist and only to married persons. The case was appealed to 
the United States Supreme Court by Sheriff Eisenstadt. In a 6 – 1 decision, the Court 
established the right of unmarried people to possess contraception on the same basis as 
married couples and the right of unmarried couples to engage in sexual intercourse. The 
Court thus struck down a Massachusetts law prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives 
to unmarried people, ruling that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Constitution.22 The majority opinion was written by Justice Brennan, who held the view 
that  
 
“If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to 
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a 
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child… We hold that by providing dissimilar 
treatment for married and unmarried persons who are similarly situated [the] Massachusetts 
Laws… violate the Equal Protection Clause”23  
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      In 1977, the Supreme Court held, in Carey v. Population Services International, 
that a New York law banning advertising or display of contraceptives, or distribution of 
contraceptives to minors under sixteen, was unconstitutional, because it violated the right 
to privacy of adults and minors.24  
In sum, Etzioni concludes this section very well: As he points out, “protection to 
privacy had become almost absolute.” He further adds, “…although Griswold was 
limited to the use of contraceptives by married couples, Eisenstadt created a new, much 
more broader conception of privacy, that of individual: A person could carry this right 
anywhere; it was a freedom that would no longer be confined to one’s bedroom or 
house.”25  
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II.  PANDORA’S BOX OPENED: ROE V. WADE (1973) AND DOE 
V. BOLTON (1973) 
 
  Griswold v. Connecticut held that no state may make pregnancy a state-imposed 
risk of sexual intimacy within marriage. The Griswold decision was explicitly rooted in 
rights of marital privacy. It reinforced the liberty of married persons to be free from 
searches and seizures conducted in their bedrooms, to be free from legal proceedings and 
to be exclusive to one another on terms of intimacy they, rather than some unit of 
government, deemed best. As Alstyne points out,  
 
“Fully in keeping with Griswold, risks incidental to acts of intimacy within marriage are for 
the married couple to appraise. It is for them to decide how to act or not act in respect to those 
risks, with altogether such degree of care and precaution as both or as either may think best, 
without any hindrance by the state.”1  
 
    
The recognition of a fundamental right to privacy in Griswold opened the 
constitutional door to a previously unimagined argument: women with unwanted 
pregnancies shall have access to legal abortion as a fundamental right. The landmark 
cases dealing with this controversial issue – Roe v. Wade (1973) and the less well-known, 
but equally important companion case Doe v. Bolton (1973) that will be of main 
concentration of this part of research, opened Pandora’s Box, which has since then 
contributed to law relating to not only contraception and abortion, but also sexual 
behaviour in general and even the right to terminate one’s life. The Supreme Court 
decisions in Roe and Doe have stirred up the public opinion and divided the whole nation 
into two camps – “pro-life” and “pro-choice”.  
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      In the United States, abortion laws began to appear in the 1850s, forbidding 
abortion after the fourth month of pregnancy. Before that time some states did not 
regulate abortion at all. There were deep social reasons for the campaign against abortion: 
the majority of women seeking abortion were married and this was for some observers a 
very alarming fact. According to “Victorian values”, a woman’s duty was to bear 
children and when the women killed their unborn baby – the life they were carrying – 
they were not only perverting their own natures and denying their “God-given role”; they 
were also helping America commit racial and genetic suicide.2 Thus a woman who went 
to the abortionist or did abortion herself and got rid of her baby was committing a terrible 
sin against society, womanhood, motherhood and obedience, which were highly valued in 
the 19th century.3  
      The anti-abortion regime remained active throughout the 20th century, when 
attitudes toward women’s role in the family and society, as well as toward sexuality, birth 
control and abortion, began to shift. Despite the ban on spreading birth control 
information, many couples practised it. Abortion and contraceptive techniques were 
illegal, available and dangerous. Abortions remained a crime under almost all states’ laws 
through to the end of the 1960s. In 1962, forty-two states allowed abortion only when 
necessary to save the life of the mother. Eight other states allowed additional therapeutic 
exceptions for health, to prevent serious bodily injury or for the safety of mother. Many 
doctors, who supported the birth control legalisation argued that according to laws they 
would be prosecuted for helping or assisting women with the procedure.4 As Hull, Hoffer 
and Hoffer say,  
 
“In 1962, the American Law Institute, an elite body of lawyers, judges and law professors, 
came to agree with these doctors that some reform of abortion law was necessary. The 
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members of the institute feared that a law so vague and varied, and so often disregarded, 
brought all law into disrespect.”5  
 
 
At the end of 1960s, a few states changed their criminal codes to allow more scope for 
doctors’ discretion in performing abortions.6 However, although the abortion law had 
been reformed, in practice little had changed. 
 
      The situation rapidly changed in 1970s, after two lawyers – Sarah Weddington 
and Linda Coffee filed a suit in federal court against the “Texas anti-abortion law”7 on 
behalf of Norma McCorvey – “Jane Roe”. In the end, after the refusal of the district’s 
court to enjoin Texas from enforcing its abortion law, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to 
hear the case. Roe v. Wade had the company of other abortion cases making their way 
toward the Supreme Court in 1971. Of the other cases on appeal, Georgian Doe v. Bolton 
also caught the attention of the justices. Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton were argued 
before the Supreme Court in December 1971 and October 1972. The Court issued its 
decision on 22nd January 1973.8  
      Jane Roe, a pregnant single woman from Texas – which had rejected abortion – 
did not have sufficient financial means to seek an abortion in other states where the 
procedure was not restricted by law, and so she brought a class action challenging the 
constitutionality of the Texas abortion laws, which do not allow the performing of 
abortions except, on medical advice, for the purpose of saving mother’s life. Roe claimed 
that the Texas statutes were unconstitutionally vague and that they abridged her right of 
personal privacy, protected by the First, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments. Roe 
purported to sue “on behalf of herself and all other women” similarly situated.9 
 22
      The Does, a childless married couple, separately attacked the laws, concerned 
about complications connected with possible future pregnancy, such us non-preparation 
for pregnancy and parenthood together with medical problems connected with pregnancy 
affecting Mrs. Doe. In the case she became pregnant; they wanted to be able to terminate 
pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent, licensed physician under safe, 
clinical conditions. Similar to the Roe case, the Does purported to sue “on behalf of 
themselves and all couples similarly situated”. 10 
      In their decision on Roe v. Wade, the U.S. Supreme Court proclaimed that most 
laws against abortion violate a constitutional right to privacy under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They decided that for the stage prior of the first 
trimester, the abortion decision shall be left to the medical judgement of the pregnant 
woman and her physician. In the interest of protecting woman’s health, states may 
restrict, but not prohibit abortions in the second three months of the pregnancy and in the 
last three months of the pregnancy, states may regulate or even prohibit abortions to 
protect the life of the foetus, except when the abortion is necessary to save the woman’s 
life.11 The Doe v. Bolton decision stated that “the medical judgement may be exercised in 
the light of all factors – physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman’s 
age – relevant to the well-being of the patient. All these factors may relate to health…”12  
      In both cases Justice Harry Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justices William Douglas, William Brennan, Potter 
Stewart, John Marshall and Lewis Powell joined. According to Justice Blackmun, 
 
“The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right to privacy… [However], the Court 
has recognised that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of 
privacy, does exist under the Constitution… These decisions make it clear that only personal 
rights that can be deemed “fundamental”… are included in this guarantee of personal privacy. 
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They also make it clear that the right has some extension to activities relating to marriage… 
procreation… contraception… family relationships… and child rearing and education…”13  
 
 
He further adds, 
 
“This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of 
personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court 
determined, in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to 
encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”14  
 
 
Justices William Rehnquist and Edward White based their dissent upon the theory 
that the right of privacy being espoused is quite a different right from the traditional 
Fourth Amendment concept of privacy and that “the Constitution should be read strictly 
and the Court should not be inventing new rights that did not appear in the language of 
the Constitution”.15 As White expressed in his dissenting opinion in Doe,  
 
“I find nothing in the language or history of the Constitution to support the Court’s 
judgement. The Court simply fashions and announces a new constitutional right for pregnant 
mothers and, with scarcely any reason or authority for its action, invests that right with 
sufficient substance to override most existing state abortion statutes… The Court apparently 
values the convenience of the pregnant mother more that the continued existence and 
development of the life or potential life that she carries.”16  
 
 
      The position of the Supreme Court is in many cases an unenviable one. The case 
would have opened Pandora’s Box whatever the Court’s decision.  Considering that 
abortion laws were created on the basis that foetus becomes alive at the time of 
conception - what kind of questions would emerge? One can only imagine. 
Unsurprisingly there has not been more a controversial case argued, in the history of 
modern U.S. case law, than the one of Jane Roe and Mary Doe.  
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III.  THE POST-ROE SITUATION 
 
      The decisions in Roe and Doe hit the nation like bombshells. Women’s rights 
advocates were surprised at the scope of their victory; many doctors regarded the 
decision as a landmark in medical treatment. The Roman Catholic Church and other 
religious spokesmen strictly rejected the outcome of the case. Street demonstrations by 
both sides became commonplace. Soon after the case was decided, the National 
Conference of Catholic Bishops joined by a number of evangelical Protestant leaders 
called for the formation of pro-life organisations and the hierarchy ordered to more than 
six hundred Catholic hospitals in the country not to allow its doctors, whether they 
wanted or not, to perform abortions.1   
      Also, in political arena, politicians who shared the anti-abortion views began to 
work for a legislative abridgement of Roe: a week after the Roe decision was announced, 
representatives of state of Maryland introduced a draft amendment to the Constitution to 
make the foetus a “person” and fetal life was to begin with conception; President Nixon 
had barred funding abortions unless they were a medical necessity, and such states as 
Connecticut and Pennsylvania denied the use of Medicaid funds for abortion “at any 
stage of the pregnancy unless one or more doctors certified in writing that the abortion 
was necessary to save the life or health of the mother, or foetus was likely to have 
crippling birth defects, or the pregnancy was the result of rape or incest that had been 
reported to the police”.2 Simply, anti-abortion state politicians sought to undermine Roe 
by imposing limitations on when and where an abortion could be performed, as well as 
the means by which a woman seeking an abortion might be convince to forgo it. 
 25
      During the decade following the decisions in Roe and Doe, the Supreme Court 
had to deal with dozens of cases regarding Roe’s outcome, such as: funding the abortion, 
imposed burdens on physicians providing abortions and women with financial difficulties 
who were seeking abortions; beginning of foetus’ life and the physical and emotional 
complications that may result from an abortion; the presence of another physician during 
abortion in order not to protect the health of the mother but to take control of the “child” 
and make every effort to save it if possible3; and many others. In sum, Congress reacted 
to the Court’s decision in the years after Roe by passing over thirty laws that restricted 
the availability of abortions.4  
During this period, there were a vast number of cases dealing with above issues. 
For the purpose of this research, I want to primarily concentrate on four specific cases, 
which in my opinion represent landmarks in further dealing with the outcome of cases of 
Roe and Doe: Webster v. Reproductive Health Services (1989), Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey (1992), Stenberg v. Carhart (2000) and very recent Gonzales v. Carhart (2007). 
 
      As a result of various legal changes, a constitutionally-based fundamental right to 
an abortion at early stages of pregnancy had barely survived and was no longer a 
fundamental right. State and federal medical care providers did not have to fund abortions 
and Justices White, Rehnquist and Scalia agreed that the Court had decided Roe wrongly 
and wanted it reversed, which would result in Roe’s constitutional underpinnings in the 
right to privacy being exposed to attack, also endangering Griswold.5 It appeared that 
year 1989 would be the year of decision. 
      In the early days of 1989, the Supreme Court agreed to hear Webster v. 
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Reproductive Health Services, another attempt by the majority in the Missouri state 
legislature to regulate abortion practices. The case was sensational, attracting extensive 
media coverage. In 1986, Missouri passed its anti-abortion laws, which included twenty 
provisions, seven of which were openly designed to discourage abortion, with the 
preamble stating that “the life of each human being begins at conception and unborn 
children have protectable interests in life, health, and well being”.6 The next provision 
required that all abortions after the sixteenth week be performed in hospitals, which 
created a problem for both doctors and patients given a third provision that no public 
hospital or public hospital worker was to take part in an abortion and no public hospital 
was expend funds on abortions. The next set of provisions applied a series of rules 
forbidding doctors from advising anyone to have an abortion, that abortion was available, 
or that one might be advisable, even if the pregnancy was in trouble. Finally, a last 
provision required doctors to ascertain, whether a foetus was viable.7 The state seemed to 
be telling doctors that it was more important to determine the viability of potentially 
viable foetus than to insure the health of the woman patient and that the potentially viable 
foetus was the doctor’s primary patient until proven otherwise.8  
      The Supreme Court in its decision upheld the constitutionality of a Missouri law 
and for the first time upheld the significant government restrictions on abortion. The 
justices issued five opinions, but no single opinion captured a majority. Justice Sandra 
Day O’Connor explained that she voted to uphold Missouri’s law because she did not feel 
that it would place an undue burden on the right to abortion – a new formula used, rather 
than the notion of “privacy” – but she declined to reconsider and overturn Roe. Justice 
Antonin Scalia sharply argued that the Court should have overturned Roe and returned to 
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the states the power to regulate abortions, rather than attempting to uphold both Roe and 
the laws at issue.9  
 
      In the Post-Webster Era, the response to the decision in the media was as 
polarised as the debate over abortion rights itself, but the journalists and the people they 
interviewed saw the issue in political, rather than legal, terms. In the course of allowing 
states to deny funding, ordain extensive consent procedures, require notification of 
parents and impose one-day waiting periods for women seeking abortions, the Court had 
torn Justice Blackmun’s trimester formula to pieces. According to Hull, Hoffer and 
Hoffer,  
 
“…The real danger to women’s rights promoters as well as pro-choice advocates in the shift 
of the Court’s reasoning was that, framed in the language of undue burden, reproductive 
choice was no longer a “fundamental right” as enunciated in Griswold and extended in Roe. 
For legislatures, the picture was somewhat different; they could continue to pass laws that 
restricted access to abortion and funding for abortion, while imposing regulations regarding 
notification, informed consent, and medical practices in abortions.”10  
 
 
However, the situation was to change in 1992, when five abortion clinics and one 
physician representing himself, as well as a group of physicians who provided abortion 
services, brought suit seeking declaratory relief, arguing that five provisions of the 
“Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act” of 1982 – the informed consent rule, the spousal 
notification rule, the parental consent rule, 24-hour waiting period and the imposition of 
certain reporting requirements on facilities providing abortion services - were 
unconstitutional.11 The case Planned Parenthood v. Casey was argued and decided in 
1992 and the Court’s lead plurality opinion upheld the right to have an abortion but 
lowered the standard for analysing restrictions of that right.12 As none of the justices’ 
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opinions was joined by a majority of justices, it is apparent that the Court remains deeply 
divided on the issue of abortion. Also, many have turned away from the idea of “privacy” 
as a justification for abortion rights. According to law professor Cass Sunstein, “the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was a better constitutional home 
for the abortion right than privacy or substantive due process”.13 Similarly, Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg had argued that the right to choose to end a pregnancy “should rest upon equal 
protection concepts rather than due process, as in Roe”.14 
 
      As many predicted, Casey was not the last word on state regulations. In 2000, a 
case - Stenberg v. Carhart - was heard by the U.S. Supreme Court dealing with a 
Nebraska law, which made performing “partial-birth abortion”15 illegal, unless necessary 
to save the mother’s life. Nebraska, like many other states, banned the procedure on the 
basis of public morality. The Court struck down the law by a 5-4 majority, finding the 
Nebraska statute criminalising “partial-birth abortions” violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and ban placed an “undue burden” upon a woman’s 
right to choose an abortion, violation of the standard established in Casey.16  
      Several issues were brought up during the oral arguments, such as the lack of an 
exception for the woman’s health the state of Nebraska took the position that “partial-
birth abortion” was never medically necessary, meaning that an exception was not 
needed. It was also argued whether or not the law could be construed to apply to other 
forms of abortion, in which case it would violate the right to privacy as described in the 
Roe and Casey decisions.17  
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      In 2003, the federal government placed a ban on partial-birth abortion, again 
without any exception for the health of the mother. In 2006, the Supreme Court 
announced that it would hear the case Gonzales v. Carhart, which was then argued in 
November 2006 and decided on 18th April 2007, and which involved the “Partial-Birth 
Abortion Act” of 2003. Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote, for the five-justice majority, that 
Congress was within its power to generally ban the procedure, although the Court left the 
door open for challenges. Kennedy's opinion did not touch upon the question of whether 
the Court's prior decisions in Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey were valid, 
but Kennedy did cite Roe and Casey, noting that the pre-viability or post-viability 
distinction was not implicated in this case. Also the majority's opinion said that the state’s 
interest in the prospective child's life from conception was still valid, and that the Act 
was narrowly tailored to address this interest. Relying on Congress’ findings that “intact 
dilation and extraction” is always unsafe, Kennedy held that a health exception was 
therefore not needed. Joining the majority were Chief Justice John Roberts, and Justices 
Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito. Justice Ginsburg and the other three 
justices dissented, contending that the ruling ignored Supreme Court abortion 
precedent.18 Justice Ginsburg's dissent was the only opinion in this case that mentioned 
the word “privacy”, and then only to deny that this case was about privacy:  
 
“Thus, legal challenges to undue restrictions on abortion procedures do not seek to vindicate 
some generalized notion of privacy; rather, they center on a woman's autonomy to determine 
her life's course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship stature.”19  
 
 
      The abortion rights debate is being held in wider prospects and has much wider 
impact rather than only on issues directly connected to abortion/anti-abortion laws. As 
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the abortion regulation controversy continued in the legislatures and courts of the nation, 
a new issue arose to trouble advocates on both sides: Could local, state, and federal 
governments regulate anti-abortion protests? Was the right to free speech 
unconstitutionally restricted when protesters at abortion clinics were either curbed by 
regulations or jailed for their activities? The violence feared by clinic doctors and their 
staff was not far away. In the late 1980s, extremists within anti-abortion groups engaged 
in a campaign of bombings. A number of physicians were killed by anti-abortion activists 
during the early 1990’s – they justified their acts in announcements stating that the 
infants they were saving from the abortionists justified the murderous assaults on the 
doctors and their escorts.20 As Hull, Hoffer and Hoffer argue, the controversy “touched 
the Establishment of Religion and Free Exercise Clauses of the amendment [and] it also 
reached out to Freedom of Speech provision.”21   
      From 1993 to 2000, pro-choice forces found an ally in President Bill Clinton and 
with his support Congress had to pass a law insuring free access to the clinics – “The 
Free Access to Clinic Entrances Act”.22 Pro-life groups immediately challenged this act’s 
constitutionality as well as its application to their activities. In 2006, under the George 
Bush’s presidency, the Legislature passed “South Dakota Women’s Health and Human 
Life Protection Act” (H.B. 1215), which was signed into law and which would forbid 
pregnancy termination under virtually any circumstance. The act had specifically defined 
pregnancy as beginning at the point of conception rather than at implantation into the 
uterine wall, which would have meant that H.B. 1215 applied to emergency contraception 
and possibly all forms of hormonal contraception.23 There is no doubt that this act would 
lead to a new wave of controversy in the U.S. legislature and jurisdiction. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 In the preceding pages, I have presented a brief account of the problematic 
principle of the right to privacy in the U.S. jurisdiction. I deliberately concentrated only 
on one aspect of privacy rights – birth control issues, in order to analyse the changing 
nature of this “right” within limits of this research; a right many scholars identify as 
fundamental even as many others deny its existence at all. Deep and extensive analysis of 
all privacy right cases, even concentrating only on those decided by the United States 
Supreme Court, would inevitably require a much more lengthy analysis which would not 
serve the purpose of this research. I believe that concentrating only on one specific, but 
very important aspect of this problematic issue enabled a deeper and better-quality 
mastery of my initial goals.  
Despite the origins of controversy in connection to privacy have begun in the 
nineteenth century (Marbury v. Madison, 1803), or as some scholars argue, even straight 
after the formation of the U.S. Constitution (Calder v. Bull, 1798), its modern history 
started in 1965 when the Supreme Court decided the landmark case Griswold v. 
Connecticut, granting the right to privacy to married couples within their intimate 
domain. The outcome of this case and landmark decisions in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. 
Bolton that were to follow was to take the lid from Pandora’s Box, putting the U.S. 
Supreme Court into the uneasy position of being in the middle of divided nation of pro-
life and pro-choice camps, and holding Solomon’s sword of justice in one of the most 
controversial cases in American legal history. These cases opened the gate to further 
controversy regarding privacy rights and made room for heated discussions in 
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professional, academic, political and layman’s circles. During post-Roe era, there was an 
attempt to apply privacy right to spheres other than birth control: homosexual rights 
(Bowers v. Hardwick, Lawrence v. Texas), the right to choose to die (Cruzan v. Director, 
Missouri Department of Health), euthanasia or assisted suicide (Washington v. 
Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill) to name but a few. The right to practice polygamy, to use 
drugs, or to commit acts of domestic violence – can we also define these, and many other 
issues, within the “right to privacy” definition? 
      The controversy about abortion rights is not only limited to the question of the 
taking of innocent life. Many pro-life supporters also support their arguments by religious 
definition of the inception of life – a concept which claims that the legal life starts with 
“ensoulment” – God giving a soul to the infant at conception. The Constitution’s First 
and Fourteenth Amendments forbid the federal government and the states from 
establishing one religion over the others and pro-choice lawyers question whether the 
courts should allow any one religious doctrine to become the very foundation of the U.S. 
laws.1 What is clear for everybody is that the question of when life begins screams for a 
scientific answer. Also, many argue that one must look deeper in the cultural values and 
answer what the fundamental role of women in society is, in order to discover the 
answers regarding abortion rights: if woman’s central role is childbearing and care, then 
abortion strikes at the heart of the social order. If women’s role and men’s role are 
exchangeable, then women should not be viewed as carriers of the next generation unless 
they choose so.2 
 
      Both Griswold and Roe (and Doe) were mostly based on the right to personal 
 33
autonomy and right to privacy. This was later criticised by even the friends of the pro-
choice position, who argued that Roe was incorrectly framed and should have rested not 
on concepts of privacy, but rather on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. As Tribe, Etzioni and Morgan argue, Roe protects a right, the right to 
privacy, that appears nowhere in the text of the Constitution.3 Rather, privacy was 
derived from the “penumbras” and “emanations” of the specifically detailed guarantees 
of the Bill of Rights. Carl Schneider put it effectively when saying that 
 
“…Nevertheless, the Court next says, “This right of privacy… is broad enough to encompass 
a woman’s decision whether of not to terminate her pregnancy.” Why that right is “broad 
enough” the Court does not say. The Court does follow this sentence with a list of 
“detriments” a woman would suffer who could not have an abortion, and one may infer that it 
is the severity of the detriments that gives rise to the right. But while the Court cannot mean 
that “detriments” create rights – since all statutes impose “detriments”, and since most 
“detriments” do not give rise to a legal right – the Court does not say why detriments create a 
right here, or why there particular detriments create this particular right.”4  
 
 
The language of judges’ opinions in abortion rights cases rests most firmly on 
constitutional law, rather than on criminal, domestic or economic law concepts. The 
Court’s majority found a fundamental right to privacy in the Constitution that included 
reproductive choice. Opponents of the decision argued that the state also had a 
constitutional duty to protect potential human life – particularly after viability.5 Deciding 
it upon the basis of concept of privacy, rather than upon the Equal Protection Clause or 
the concept of personal autonomy, made the language of the decision itself highly 
controversial. As we could see in post-Roe cases, for instance Webster v. Reproductive 
Health Services or Planned Parenthood v. Pennsylvania, even justices themselves 
acknowledged that Roe was decided incorrectly: Justices O’Connor and Ginsburg argued 
that the decision would have been framed better within equal protection and undue 
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burden grounds, rather than privacy grounds – and so they did in consecutive cases. 
 Second, as Tribe points out, “…the simplest argument against Roe, an argument 
that has great resonance in a nation devoted to principles of democracy, criticizes Roe as 
antidemocratic.”6 Both Tribe and Morgan strictly argue that the Supreme Court did not 
have the right to decide such an important issue itself, but rather, should have left this 
issue of “individual rights that was a matter of moral controversy to be decided solely by 
the legislative and executive branches.”7 It is arguable, whether passing the responsibility 
onto different branches would have solved the problem in efficient manner. In order to 
choose the right group to decide, we need to specify who the one to decide is about such 
an important matter as when the life begins – shall we leave this responsibility to 
theologians, medical professionals, or shall it be the task for legislators or members of the 
Supreme Court? The only thing one can be sure about is that no matter who decides, the 
decisions will always raise controversy. 
 
 Medical developments, such as better and more reliable types of contraception, 
“morning-after” pills, which may cause the dramatic decline in the number of abortions 
sought, also cause controversy as does the use of embryonic and foetal tissue used as vital 
components for the treatment of Parkinson’s disease, Alzheimer’s disease and other types 
of brain and spinal dysfunctions. Some argue that this research could lead to possible 
future experiments with the cloning of human beings. Pregnant women may give 
permission for the tissue of their aborted foetus to be used in such fashion (indeed, within 
the privacy concept), which may fuel the debate even more. The right to privacy 
controversy is still ranging, and the justices appear to have called a halt to any extension 
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of personal privacy.  
Last, the presidential elections of 2008 will have inevitable impact on the future 
of abortion rights. Candidates Barack Obama and John McCain have both different 
viewpoints on this issue. Although neither Obama nor McCain wish to overrule Roe v. 
Wade (as they both believe this step would lead to more illegal abortions); Obama is 
clearly pro-choice oriented, whereas McCain’s views are strictly pro-life. Obama believes 
that common grounds can be found with regards to achieving equilibrium between pro-
life and pro-choice decisions. On the other hand, McCain’s goal is to make Roe decision 
irrelevant as in his opinion, abortions may not be needed anymore. In addition, as he 
claims that he will nominate justices based on their experience and those who share his 
values, we may see interesting development of this highly-charged issue.8 Only time will 
show what the future brings and what other consequences discussed cases will have on 
the society. 
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APPENDIX  
 
Amendment I – Freedom of Religion, Press, Expression. Ratified 15.12.1791 
 Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right 
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances. 
 
Amendment IV – Search and Seizure. Ratified 15.12.1791 
 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
 
Amendment V – Trial and Punishment, Compensation for Takings. Ratified 15.12.1791 
 No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, 
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land 
of naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; 
nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or 
limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private 
property be taken for public use without compensation. 
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Amendment VIII – Cruel and Unusual punishment. Ratified 15.12.1791 
 Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and 
unusual punishment inflicted. 
 
Amendment IX – Construction of Constitution. Ratified 15.12.1791 
 The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to 
deny or disparage others retained by the people. 
 
Amendment XIII – Slavery abolished. Ratified 6.12.1865 
 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime 
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted shall exist within the United States, or 
any place subject to their jurisdiction. 
 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. 
 
Amendment XIV – Citizenship rights. Ratified 9.7.1868 
 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws… 
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